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INTERNATIONAL
South Africa
From Confrontation 
to Cooperation
24 By M o h a m e d  E l-K h a w a s  
(S e c o n d  o f tw o  p a rts )
I n the 1990s, South Africa appears to be inching closer to an era of peaceful co­existence with its neighbors. There 
are signs that it is shifting from confronta­
tion to cooperation, particularly with 
Angola and Mozambique.
The first of this two-part series dealt with 
South Africa and Angola; the second focus­
es on Mozambique.
South Africa and Mozambique
Initially, South Africa pursued two different 
policies toward Mozambique and Angola.
It objected to the Movimento Popular de 
Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) coming to 
power in Angola, but did not oppose the 
ascendance to power in 1975 of the 
Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique 
(FRELIMO) in Mozambique. It knew that 
FRELIMO, out of economic necessity, 
would pursue a pragmatic policy. In fact, 
up until 1980, South Africa maintained 
economic ties with Mozambique even 
though the two countries had no formal 
diplomatic relations.
Mozambique has long been dependent 
on South Africa for economic survival, hav­
ing inherited from the Portuguese an 
economy that was closely linked with South 
Africa. Mozambique provides transit facil­
ities for South African goods; sells electri­
city to Pretoria from the Cahora Bassa 
Dam; provides workers for South African 
mines. For years, these transactions have 
helped Mozambique ease its shortages in 
foreign exchange earnings.
Although Mozambique’s government, 
under Samora Machel, continued to deal 
with South Africa on economic matters, it 
remained committed to majority rule in 
South Africa, and to its support for the 
African National Congress (ANC) by occa­
sionally allowing ANC fighters to cross its 
borders and carry out armed attacks inside 
South Africa.
At the beginning of the 1980s, however, 
South Africa initiated a more aggressive 
policy toward Mozambique and other neigh­
boring states by unleashing air and ground 
strikes against suspected ANC targets.1
This change in strategy came about as 
a result of: (1) growing ANC sabotage ac­
tivities inside South Africa; (2) the end of 
white rule in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe); and (3) 
a change of leadership in the U.S.
On January 30, 1981, only 10 days after 
the presidential inauguration of Ronald 
Reagan, South African commandos struck
inside Mozambique for the first time. They 
raided ANC residences in Matola, a suburb 
of Maputo, the capital city, killing 13 peo­
ple and kidnapping 3 others.2 This action 
marked the start of repeated military in­
cursions by South African forces into Mo­
zambique and neighboring countries. In the 
following years, Pretoria intensified its 
policy of swift retribution,-after ANC 
fighters attacked government buildings in­
side South Africa, causing heavy casualties.
On May 23, 1983, South Africa’s Air 
Force was used for the first time to attack 
ANC offices in Maputo, killing 5 and wound­
ing 40. This air raid was a reprisal for a car- 
bomb explosion in Pretoria three days 
earlier, which killed 18 people and wound­
ed 190.3
South Africa’s repeated military actions 
inside Mozambique were intended to pres­
sure the government of Samora Machel to 
cease its assistance to the ANC. Also,
South Africa resolved to escalate its desta­
bilization campaign by providing a safe 
haven inside South Africa for the right-wing 
insurgent group, Mozambique National 
Resistance (RENAMO), which had been 
expelled from Zimbabwe in 1980. To this 
day, RENAMO is waging a guerrilla war to 
oust the government in Mozambique, with 
the help of South Africa, which has sup­
plied the group with training, weapons, and 
logistical support along the Indian Ocean 
coastline.
While South Africa did not initially an­
nounce its support of RENAMO publicly, 
Mozambican officials have said all along that 
there was clear evidence of such support. 
In December 1981, for example, docu­
ments were found in a RENAMO camp that 
reported on meetings between its leader, 
Afonso Dhlakama, and South African offi­
cials a year earlier. In one of the documents, 
a South African officer is quoted as saying, 
“ instructors who go into Mozambique will 
not only teach, but also participate in 
attacks.’’4
South Africa also provided RENAMO 
with broadcasting facilities to help it spread 
anti-government propaganda in Mozam­
bique, through The Voice of the Mozam­
bique National Resistance, which went on 
the air inside South Africa during the early 
1980s.
Pretoria’s assistance to RENAMO, as 
noted earlier, was intended to put pressure 
on the Machel government to disavow the 
ANC. And the longer Machel continued 
supporting the ANC, the bigger the 
RENAMO campaign became. By 1983, 
RENAMO was active in 7 out of the 10 
provinces in Mozambique. Its subversive 
campaigns succeeded in disrupting the 
economy, which was already hard hit by a 
severe drought.
According to official estimates, there 
were approximately 1,000,000 displaced 
persons in Mozambique in 1986, all forced 
to abandon their farms and flee their homes 
in the face of RENAMO attacks on their 
villages. In addition, 300,000 others had fled 
to South Africa and Zimbabwe.
The dislocation of so many people has 
had an adverse impact on agriculture, caus­
ing severe grain shortages and forcing the 
government to rely heavily on foreign aid 
to meet the country’s food needs. This 
situation exacerbated problems caused by 
the 1981-1984 drought, during which about
100,000 people died of hunger in Mozam­
bique. Subsequent flooding washed out 
roads and bridges, adding further barriers
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to emergency deliveries of food and 
medicine.
After the drought emergency, in 1986, it 
was estimated that about 2,000,000 peo­
ple were threatened by further starvation 
because “ rebel attacks combined to 
strangle food production and hinder an in­
ternational relief effort.” 5
To make it more difficult for the Machel 
government to cope with its ailing economy, 
South Africa also put economic pressures 
on Mozambique. First, the number of 
Mozambicans working in South African 
mines dropped sharply, from 120,000 prior 
to 1975 to only 40,000 in 1983. Their earn­
ings had helped ease Mozambique’s foreign 
exchange problems. Second, South Africa 
reduced its use of Mozambique’s transit 
facilities, dropping from 6,000,000 tons of 
exports in 1973 to only 2,000,000 tons in 
1982.6 Third, it cut its utilization of elec­
tricity from the Cahora Bassa Dam. These 
measures caused a sizeable decline in 
Mozambique’s foreign exchange earnings 
and contributed to the worsening of its 
already bleak economic situation.
South Africa’s destabilization campaign 
thus made it costly for the Machel govern­
ment to continue support for the ANC. 
Pretoria had used a “ big stick” to let 
Mozambican officials know that they could 
not resolve their domestic problems with­
out first dealing with the South African de­
mand to bring cross-border raids to an end.
The same message was echoed by the 
U.S., but with hints of help in pulling 
Mozambique out of its economic dif­
ficulties. In June 1983, Lawrence Eagle- 
burger, U.S. undersecretary of state, said 
in San Francisco that the Reagan adminis­
tration was pressing ‘ ‘for dialogue between 
South Africa and Mozambique, and an end 
to cross-border violence.” 7
The Nkomati Accord
In the fall of 1983, Machel laid the ground­
work for rapprochement with South Africa. 
He began to scale down his dependence on 
the Soviet bloc and to move closer to the 
West, with a visit, in October 1983, to 
Europe to attract “ massive and immediate 
Western investment and aid.” 8 He also 
sought to convince Portugal and Britain to 
give his country military assistance, espe­
cially in the area of counterinsurgency 
training.
While Machel was touring Europe, South 
African commandos blew up several ANC 
houses near the presidential residence in 
Maputo. And South African Defense Min­
ister Magnus Malan asserted that the 
attacks were in retaliation for the damag­
ing of oil storage facilities the week before 
in Warmbaths, N orthern Transvaal.9 
Malan blamed the Mozambican govern­
ment for its failure to heed repeated 
demands by South Africa ‘ ‘to get rid of the 
ANC.” He also warned that “ as long as 
they continue to help the ANC with the 
planning of terrorist acts and continue to 
harbor and provide facilities to the ANC, 
the South African Defense Force will con­
duct operations in that country.” 10
South Africa provided 
RENAMO with broad­
casting facilities to help it 
spread anti-government 
propaganda in 
M ozambique.. .
South Africa’s attacks in Maputo dem­
onstrated Mozambique’s vulnerability to 
military intervention. Mozambique was de­
fenseless; it was unable to stop South 
Africa’s incursions. And, following the Oc­
tober 1983 raid, Malan pointed out that ‘ ‘it 
was but a small taste of what was to come 
if neighboring states continued to harbor 
terrorists.’ ’ He warned that “ South Africa 
has not yet wielded its ‘iron fist’ but its pa­
tience is wearing thin.” 11 
Under these circumstances, Machel had 
no other choice but to deal directly with 
Pretoria and get South Africa to end its 
military attacks and its backing of the 
Mozambican rebels. Both the U.S. and Por­
tugal played key roles in getting Pretoria 
and Maputo to discuss security and eco­
nomic matters. Finally, in March 1984, the 
Nkomati Accord was signed, ending years 
of hostility between the two countries. Both 
countries prom ised to discontinue
assistance to insurgent groups. In addition, 
South Africa was to increase trade and 
tourism and offer economic assistance to 
Mozambique.
The Machel government kept its part of 
the deal by taking steps to halt ANC activi­
ties in Mozambique. Police raided ANC 
buildings in Maputo and confiscated wea­
pons. In addition, hundreds of South Afri­
can refugees were ordered to leave the 
country.12 These measures drew sharp 
criticism from ANC leaders, who voiced 
their determination to continue their armed 
struggle.
But South Africa did not fulfill its obliga­
tions under the Nkomati pact. In particular, 
it continued to provide covert aid to the 
Mozambican insurgency. Diaries of a 
RENAMO field commander captured in 
August 1985 revealed that the South African 
military agreed to stockpile weapons for 
RENAMO just before the Nkomati pact 
was signed. Further, Colonel Cornelius 
(Charles) van Niekerk, South African 
military liaison to RENAMO, worked out 
plans to continue to train RENAMO forces 
inside South Africa and to supply them with 
ammunition for their sabotage campaigns 
in Mozambique. He even urged RENAMO 
leaders to turn down Machel’s amnesty 
offer that was made in accordance with its 
agreem ent with Pretoria. And after 
RENAMO’s main headquarters were 
moved out of South Africa to neighboring 
Malawi, South African diplomats in Malawi 
continued to assist RENAMO and coor­
dinate their country’s covert assistance.13
In September 1985, in response to these 
revelations, the Machel government sus­
pended its participation in the joint com­
mission set up under the Nkomati pact.14 
Mozambican officials were disappointed 
with Pretoria’s failure to cease all support 
for RENAMO and were having second 
thoughts about the pact. There was grow­
ing opposition to the Nkomati pact in 
Maputo’s ruling circles because the contin­
uing flow of South African arms and sup­
plies had enabled RENAMO to expand its 
activities. Under these circumstances, 
Mozambique resolved to quietly discard the 
non-aggression pact with South Africa.
Mozambique was also critical of the U.S. 
role due to the fact that the U.S. neither 
pressured South Africa to honor the pact 
nor increased its economic assistance and 
investment in Mozambique. The Reagan 
administration gave Mozambique $73 
million in foodstuffs between 1983 and 1985, 
but was unable to provide more economic
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development assistance because of opposi­
tion in Congress to the Marxist regime in 
Maputo.The Gramm- Rudman legislation 
led to further reductions in the economic 
aid package, which amounted to $9.5 million 
in 1986, about $3.5 million less than the year 
before. Nor was there any prospect for a 
substantial increase in American corporate 
investm ent because of RENAM O’s 
destabilizing military campaign throughout 
the country.15
The Machel government also found that 
the Western powers could not meet all of 
its military needs to fight the insurgency. 
The U.S. Congress rejected the Reagan ad­
ministration’s request for $4.6 million in 
nonlethal military aid for Mozambique over 
two years. And Britain provided only a mod­
est training program for the Mozambican 
military, while Portugal did not respond to 
requests for military supplies and training 
in counterinsurgency.16
In view of these developments, Machel 
concluded that the West could not help his 
country pull out of its economic and secur­
ity problems. In April 1986, he traveled to 
Moscow to seek more Soviet aid. He was 
seeking a military solution, with the help 
of Zimbabwe, which had been affected by 
RENAMO’s sabotage of Mozambique’s 
harbors and transit facilities.
As another line of defense, the Mozam­
bican government took steps to deny 
RENAMO the use of Malawi as a sanctuary 
and a supply base. In September 1986, a 
regional summit was held in Blantyre, 
Malawi’s capital, during which Machel, 
along with Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe and 
Zambia’s Kenneth Kaunda, urged Malawi’s 
Hastings Kamuzu Banda to hand the 
RENAMO rebels over to Mozambican au­
thorities. Banda refused; instead, he prom­
ised to expel the rebels from his country. 
When Banda was slow in fulfilling his 
pledge, the Mozambican government 
threatened to blockade Malawi.17
On October 6, 1986, six South African 
soldiers were wounded by a land mine just 
inside the border with Mozambique. This 
incident marked the resumption of the 
ANC’s activities from Mozambique. In 
response, Pretoria retaliated by banning 
further hiring of Mozambicans wishing to 
work in South Africa. Further, it informed 
the Machel government that 68,665 
Mozambicans already working in South 
African mines would return home upon the 
expiration of their contracts.18
South Africa said the action was taken 
“ as a result of the activities of the ANC
and the South African Communist Party, 
who are responsible for the continuing 
deteriorating security situation on the com­
mon border.. .  and who, according to infor­
mation in possession of [the government], 
as confirmed by recent incidents, is still 
operating from Mozambique.’’19 
Thus, the Nkomati Accord of 1984 was 
decisively put to rest—a situation that led 
to a renewed South African destabilization 
campaign in Mozambique.
On October 11, 1986 Mozambican of­
ficials accused Pretoria of massing troops 
along their border and of sending comman­
do units “ to carry out acts of terrorism’’ 
in their country. The following day, leaders 
of the frontline states held a summit in 
Maputo and accused Pretoria of ‘ ‘preparing 
for war.’’ They called on “all the peoples 
and governments of the world to block 
South Africa’s race toward generalized 
war.” 20
On October 19,1986, Machel, along with 
33 other Mozambican officials, died in a 
suspicious plane crash near Mbuzini, in 
South Africa, while on a flight home from 
Lusaka, Zambia. This incident took place 
just a week after the South African defense 
minister had predicted that the Machel gov­
ernment was ‘ ‘about to collapse’ ’ because 
of the ailing economy and RENAMO’s suc­
cessful insurgency.21 It is in this context 
that some African leaders, and others 
wondered whether Pretoria had something 
to do with Machel’s death.
After Machel, Joachim Chissano became 
the president of Mozambique during a most 
difficult period in its history. Since taking 
power in 1986, he has dealt with serious 
domestic problems resulting from RE­
NAMO’s stepped-up sabotage campaign 
and Pretoria’s attacks on suspected ANC 
quarters in Maputo. Chissano’s pragmatism 
has led him to try again to move closer to 
the West, to reduce his country’s depend­
ence on the Soviet Union, and to mend 
fences with South Africa. His diplomatic in­
itiative was a success for the following 
reasons:
□  First, the new detente between Mos­
cow and Washington has led the super­
powers to become actively involved in
the search for political solutions for the 
Southern African region.
□  Second, the Kremlin, under Mikhail 
Gorbachev’s leadership, has lost inter­
est in pouring millions of dollars of 
scarce resources into a distant military 
entanglement.
□  Third, the economic sanctions against 
South Africa and the high cost of its 
military campaigns in Mozambique and 
other neighboring countries have led 
the South African government to try 
to break out of isolation through a 
policy of communication rather than 
confrontation.
These developments have made it easier 
for Chissano to attract Western economic 
assistance, especially since he has con­
tinued to eliminate some of the socialist 
elements in the Mozambican economy, and 
to receive loans from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF).
In September 1988, Chissano, with the 
help of Britain, held a summit with South 
Africa’s Botha in Songo, Mozambique. 
These talks resulted in reviving the 1984 
Nkomati Accord. Botha pledged to discon­
tinue support to RENAMO, to provide 
technical and security assistance, and to 
“ rebuild power lines from the Cahora 
Bassa hydro-electric power project that 
were destroyed by RENAMO.” 22 He also 
promised “ substantial financial aid to 
Mozambique.” 23
The change in government in South 
Africa in 1989 did not result in any change 
in policy toward Mozambique. President 
Frederik W. de Klerk continued to work for 
the improvement of relations with Mozam­
bique. In December 1989, he met with 
Chissano in Maputo and announced that his 
government ‘ ‘does not aid RENAMO in any 
way whatever.” 24 However, he 
acknowledged that some South Africans 
are still sending equipment and funds to 
RENAMO. This fact meant that some 
South Africans, probably including the 
military or intelligence personnel, have 
maintained their leverage for destabilizing 
Mozambique. Under these circumstances, 
Chissano called upon Pretoria to ‘ ‘increase 
its efforts” to halt the flow of arms and 
money to RENAMO across the border.25
In Maputo, de Klerk also discussed 
Chissano’s efforts aimed at ending the civil 
war in Mozambique. Last July, the South 
African leader had already endorsed these 
initiatives and had called on RENAMO to 
agree to a cease-fire and to help rebuuild 
the economy of the war-torn country.26
Chissano’s peace initiatives were also 
backed by the Bush adm inistration. 
Herman Cohen, assistant secretary of state 
for African affairs, travelled to the region 
in July 1989 to explore ‘ ‘the possibilities for 
fostering peace in Mozambique.” 27
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Chissano suddenly shifted his policy in 
mid-1989, favoring a negotiated settlement 
for the civil war, which neither side could 
win in the battlefield. The reasons for his 
shift were:
□  First, the South African government 
has ceased its support for RENAMO 
and has begun to cooperate with 
Mozambique.
□  Second, the Soviet Union, Mozam­
bique’s main arms supplier, decided 
to begin pulling its military advisors 
out of Mozambique over 18 months 
and to reduce its military assistance 
by 40 percent.
□  Third, Zimbabwe, which has had 
troops defending key transportation 
routes in Mozambique, pressured the 
Chissano government for talks with 
RENAMO.
□  Fourth, the climate in Southern Africa 
encouraged talks among adversaries, 
especially after a settlem ent in 
Namibia was reached and a cease-fire 
took hold in Angola.
Chissano hoped that the Angolan model 
could be used to end the fighting in his coun­
try. He called upon RENAMO “ to follow 
suit’’ and sought the backing of the United 
Nations to start a dialogue with the 
rebels.28
RENAMO, on the other hand, insisted 
that “any cease-fire has to be mutual, not 
unilateral’’ as Chissano proposed. Luis 
Serapiao, RENAMO’s representative in 
Washington and professor at Howard 
University, stated:
Talks have to be among equal partners 
without preconditions. The govern­
ment is offering [a] dialogue about 
ending the fighting and potentially 
about the conditions of amnesty for 
RENAMO members. But it is not 
willing to agree to power-sharing 
negotiations.29
In October 1989, Afonso Dhlakama re­
jected direct talks with the Mozambican 
government because his movement does 
“ not recognize it as a sovereign state.’ ’ He 
instead “ wanted to speak, not to the 
government, but to the FRELIMO Par­
ty.’’30 As a result, a stalemate continued.
Thus, the peace process, which was in­
itiated by officials of Mozambique’s Catholic 
and Anglican churches, was deadlocked 
because the rebels had declined to accept 
Chissano’s offer to end violence and 
recognize the country’s constitution.
RENAMO’s officials have demanded that a 
constituent assembly be elected and a 
multiparty system be created.31
To break the stalemate, Kenya’s Daniel 
arap Moi and Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe, 
who accepted the role of mediators, sought 
to find a formula that would bring the two 
factions together for direct talks on a political 
solution for the internal conflict in 
Mozambique.
Meanwhile, Chisssano, in an attempt to 
induce RENAMO to start a dialogue, has 
continued the reforms to liberalize the coun­
try’s economy and, in January 1990, outlined 
a new draft constitution aimed at address­
ing some of the criticism expressed by 
RENAMO and other Mozambicans. He pro­
posed that the president be elected by 
universal suffrage and secret ballot. Two or 
more candidates will run for the president’s 
office. Also, there will be direct elections 
for members of parliament. National elec­
tions can be held in 1991.32
These reforms were not sufficient to lure 
RENAMO to the negotiating table, however. 
To break the stalemate, Moi and Mugabe 
suggested that the Mozambican government 
and RENAMO should agree to unconditional 
talks. In addition, Malawi’s Hastings Banda 
urged RENAMO to start direct talks in his 
capital on June 12, 1990. But this meeting 
never took place. It was not until July 8,1990 
that direct talks between the Mozambican 
government and RENAMO took place in 
Rome. It is noteworthy that neither Kenya 
nor Zimbabwe attended the Rome meeting.
At the end of the three-day meeting, the 
parties agreed to meet again in Rome to 
seek ‘ ‘a platform for work that will bring the 
war to an end and create poliltical, economic 
and social conditions that will bring lasting 
peace and normalization of life to all Mozam­
bican citizens.” 34
It is too early to tell whether direct talks 
will lead to a peaceful solution to the bloody 
civil war in Mozambique. It is now up to the 
Chissano government and RENAMO 
leaders to find ways to end the conflict, 
rebuild the country and develop its economy.
The peace initiatives have a good chance 
to succeed because of the end of the cold 
war and the backing of the front-line states, 
as well as South Africa, the U.S. and the 
Soviet Union. In the final analysis, however, 
Mozambican leaders have the ultimate 
responsibility for the success or failure of 
the peace negotiations. □
Mohamed El-Khawas, Ph.D., is a professor of history 
and associate provost of the University of the District 
of Columbia.
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